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Abstract
We present a model of preferences on welfare transfers, which incor-
porates the recipient’s wealth as a signal of needs and deservingness. We
show that a paradox may arise: the poorer the recipient is, the less trans-
fer he will get. Implications might include the negative impact of targeting
assistance to the poorest on public support for welfare.
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1 Introduction
The variation of welfare regimes of the advanced economies has attracted consid-
erable scholarly interest in the past few decades. Students of various disciplines
seem to agree on that the public image of the poor is a key to the understanding
of the diverging institutional frameworks.
We follow this line, and present a model of compassionate voters’ preferences
on welfare transfers to the poor. The model shows that the uncertainty about
the recipient’s behavior might lead to paradoxical preferences: the poorer the
recipient is, the less transfer he would get. The paradox, we conjecture, may
contribute to some kind of institutional framing effects discussed in the social
policy literature.
As far as the behavioral assumptions are concerned, we draw on those the-
ories and evidence which point to “deservingness” as a key concept in voters’
minds. The voter (She) decides on the optimal level of transfer for any poor in-
dividual (He). She cannot observe the recipient’s efforts, but is informed about
his wealth, which indicates material needs, but also provides noisy information
on his efforts. His distress fuels her compassion, but, at the same time, sends
a negative signal on his efforts. This ambiguity, in turn, may give rise to the
paradox we discuss below.
2 The problem
The puzzle we address is posed by findings in polls which, according to Larsen
(2006), indicate that the targeting of poverty alleviating institutions to the very
poorest might have an adverse effect on public opinion: a smaller, poorer group
of potential beneficiaries implies a worse image of the poor and lower support
for welfare than a larger, more mixed set of welfare recipients.
Our model might lay the ground for understanding the above results and the
narrative arguments behind. It is a much simpler and less ambitious analysis
than the ones presented by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou and Tirole
(2006), and Di Tella and Dubra (2013), which investigated the simultaneous
developments of beliefs, efforts and redistribution. We only concentrate on
welfare transfers to the poor, and aim at pointing to mechanisms which stem
from recipients’ living standards as a signaling device.
3 The model
Our approach partly relies on Besley and Coate’s (1992) model of preferences
on welfare transfers to the poor. Like their model, we assume that voters intend
to help distressed and deserving individuals. That is, they support transfers
which compensate for poverty due to bad luck, but are reluctant to relieve
distress which stems from lack of efforts. Some more comprehensive models on
redistributive preferences adopt similar assumptions (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos
2005; but see Di Tella and Dubra 2010 for a different approach), and a recent
wave of economic research argues in favor of their empirical validity (e.g. Fong
and Luttmer, 2011; Konow, 2010). A great many findings of polls also indicate
the popular concern for deservingness (e.g. Gilens, 1999; Lepianka et al., 2009).
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We also follow Besley and Coate’s (1992) approach by assuming that voters are
uncertain about the recipients’ behavioral traits.
However, we introduce the level of the recipient’s wealth as a key information
for the voter’s decision on the optimal level of transfer. Moreover, unlike their
model, we focus on the pure effects of social preferences.
Let us start with a simple model of the compassionate voter’s preferences in
society S:
Ui = V (Wi) +
∑
j
Dij(Wj , Ej , Fj)
where i, jS, and i 6=j. W is a measure of living standards, and Ej accu-
mulates all the multiplicative factors of Wj for which i imposes responsibility
on j (e.g. personality traits like effort). Fj , on the other hand, accumulates
multiplicative factors the voter is ready to compensate j for (e.g. situational
factors like (mis)fortune). The voter assumes that W=EF .1
From now on we concentrate on the pure effects of social preferences, namely,
Dij which expresses the voter’s (dis)utility stemming from observing the distress
of misfortunate fellow citizens. In this way, we simplify our analysis without
altering our qualitative results; and, more importantly, make as clear as possible
that the paradox we show can emerge fully independently of ’the taxpayer’s
resentment’.
The voter in our model cares only about the poorest and misfortunate ones;
namely, those who fell below the poverty line, Wp, and their efforts would justify
higher living standards than they have. Consider first the full information envi-
ronment. Observing a fellow citizen, her (dis)utility function takes the following
form:
Dij = 0 for Wj = EjFmed or Wj =Wp , and
Dij = max(Wj − EjFmed,Wj −Wp) for Wj < EjFmed and Wj < Wp (1)
where Fmed is the median value of ’fortune’ in S. That is, the compassionate
voter derives disutility from observing a poor individual who is less fortunate
than the majority of the population in S (c.f. Alesina and Angeletos 2005).
Note that at any given level of a poor j’s ’misfortune’ (where Fj <Fmed), the
fall in i’s utility grows with the efforts of j. This reflects the voter’s concern
for deservingness. It is plausible to assume that in a modern aﬄuent society
EmedFmed > Wp. We do not exploit this assumption below, but it ensures that
the voter ignores only such poor who are ’lazier’ than the majority of the society
(Ej <Emed). One can also see from (1) that i’s pure social preferences imply
that the optimal level of transfers to j is equal to max
(
min(EjFmed−Wj ,Wp−
Wj), 0
)
. Note that if a poor enough individual j with personality traits Ej is
given, then the voter’s social preferences never justify any decrease of transfers
as j’s livings standards deteriorate in the full information environment.
A crucial assumption of our model, however, is that the voter cannot observe
Ej and Fj directly. She observes, on the other hand, Wj , and has prior beliefs on
the distributions E and F . Based on her priors and the observed Wj , the voter
1Note the difference between this approach and the ones of e.g. Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), or Di Tella and Dubra (2010).
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can estimate the posterior probability distributions of j’s ’effort’ and ’fortune’.
Those posteriors can be used, in turn, to determine the optimal level of transfers.
In the most general case, this takes the form of an expected utility maximization
over the possible values of Fj . We can state a general theorem in this framework.
In this letter, however, we deal with the easily tractable special case where
the preferred level of compensation is determined simply by the median of j’s
posterior effort, Eˆj(Wj , E, F ). That is, the voter uses a point estimation to
calculate the optimal level of transfers.
We assume that the voter is informed about the scholarly observation that
the log-normal distribution is a good fit for the empirical wealth distribution
for much of the wealth range (Chatterjee et al., 2007). In the voter’s model, E
and F are independent log-normal distributions whose product, W – which is
log-normal itself –, approximates the observed distribution of living standards
in the society. Multiplicative constants don’t affect our model, so we can assume
without loss of generality that Emed=Fmed=1. Then, based on i’s social pref-
erences, beliefs and observation, one can express the optimal level of transfers
to j as follows:
T (Wj) = max
(
min(Eˆj −Wj ,Wp −Wj), 0
)
Let us denote the logarithms of our variables with lower case versions. w =
e + f . Note that we assume without loss of generality that e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and
f ∼ N(0, σ2f ). The parameters σe and σf represent the voter’s prior beliefs on
the relative strength of the roles of E and F . w ∼ N(0, σ2e+σ2f ), so σ2w = σ2e+σ2f
is observable. Given this constraint, any belief on the variances of E and F is
compatible with rationality. We define the voter’s perceived meritocracy index
µ as σ2e/σ
2
w.
After introducing the meritocracy index, we can formulate our theorem on
the paradox (subscript j is left out for convenience):
Theorem 1. (Existence of Poverty-Assistance Paradox). Consider any W <
W
1/µ
p . Then, T (W )<T (W ) for any 0<<1 iff W<µ1/(1−µ).
The ratio of the population affected by the paradox cannot be given in a
closed form. Numerical calculations show that it strongly and positively corre-
lates with inequality, and (within the constrains given by Wp) less strongly with
the perceived meritocracy.
4 Proof of the Theorem
In our simple model, the median posterior effort has a particularly clean form:
Proposition 1. Eˆ = Wµ.
Proof. Working with the Gaussian joint probability distribution (e, f) it is easy
to prove that conditioned on observing w = e+ f , the posterior distribution of
e is again a Gaussian N(m(w), d2), with parameters
d2 :=
1
1
σ2e
+ 1
σ2f
=
σ2eσ
2
f
σ2w
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and
m(w) :=
d2
σ2f
w =
σ2e
σ2w
w = µw.
From this we can indeed conclude that
Eˆ = expm(logW ) = Wµ.
Proof. (of Theorem 1) We claim that T (W ) has a unique maximum at Wmax :=
µ1/(1−µ). In our theorem, we only consider the case where Wµ = Eˆ < Wp. In
this case, T = Wµ −W . Taking the derivative of Wµ −W it is easy to see
that it has a single positive root at Wmax, and the second derivative is positive
there.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis sheds light on the implications of incorporating recipients’ living
standards as a signaling device into models on welfare preferences. The emer-
gence of poverty-assistance paradox we described is highly dependent on the
way beliefs and preferences are modeled. We showed that, given our model on
preferences, rational beliefs can easily produce the paradox.
Our model on preferences lacks a direct preference for securing a minimal
income for anyone – irrespective of his behavior. It also lacks a direct preference
for punishing low effort. The former assumption could inhibit, the latter one
would assist the emergence of the paradox.
Our research in progress deals with three important generalizations of the
base result: 1. additional observed and/or hidden variables, 2. not fully in-
dependent variables, 3. optimization within the framework of expected utility
maximization. It can be shown that even with these generalizations, the Para-
dox arises under very plausible assumptions.
We did not present a model of voting on redistribution. We conjecture, how-
ever, that incorporating the assumptions leading to the paradox into a political
economy model could help to understand the adverse effects of targeting pub-
lic assistance to the poorest groups on welfare preferences better (c.f. Larsen,
2006). The intuition is straightforward: targeting to the very poor may create a
group of potential beneficiaries whose members are, individually, less supported
by the representative voter than less distressed low status persons outside this
small group. Nonetheless, a strong effect of ’taxpayer resentment’ would surely
complicate any such model, since targeting saves on taxpayers’ money.
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